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I. Introduction
The economics literature typically describes R&D and investment in innovation as activities that
create new knowledge. But some innovative activity is directed, instead, toward facilitating the
communication of technical knowledge, sometimes to significant effect.
For example, as part of writing a general chemistry textbook during the 1860s, Mendeleev
developed a periodic table to summarize experimentally-derived knowledge about chemical properties.
This table facilitated the education of new chemists. Chemistry students no longer needed to study and
absorb hundreds of seemingly unrelated experiments. Instead, they could readily infer chemical
properties from the highly formalized representation in the periodic table. Along with new laboratory
techniques for the analysis and synthesis of chemicals, this table changed the chemical industry,
fostering some of the first industrial R&D laboratories, making innovation more geographically
dispersed, and making firms more reliant on patents (Haber 1958, Moser 2007, 2010). This new
representation of chemical knowledge changed the chemical industry because it changed the cost of
communicating technical knowledge.
Other examples of such scientific abstraction include Newton’s Laws and Maxwell’s equations. In
addition, other sorts of activities also “formalize” technical knowledge, thereby reducing communication
costs. Observational or tacit knowledge is codified so that it can be referenced more easily—much
technical industry literature consists of this sort of information. Technology standards play a similar role
in reducing communication costs, especially where firms need to coordinate activity.
Similarly, “dominant designs” such as the Wintel standard reduce the complexity of knowledge,
facilitating its spread. Finally, knowledge can be embodied in hardware or software so that it can be
automatically applied. In each of these instances, an investment in formalization serves to reduce the
marginal cost of communicating technical knowledge. Casual observation suggests that such formalizing
activities account for an important part of industrial innovative investment. And the example of
chemistry suggests that these changes in knowledge can exert a large influence on industry behavior and
on firm knowledge strategies.
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This activity of formalizing knowledge implies that communication costs are endogenous, that is,
economic actors choose to invest in formalization depending on economic conditions. In contrast, the
assumption in most of the literature is that communication costs are exogenously fixed. For example,
exogenously low communication costs underpin Arrows’s (1962) finding that innovations tend to be
undersupplied in competitive markets because of insufficient appropriability and Romer’s argument
(1990) that innovations give rise to increasing returns to scale. Yet endogenous communication costs
raise the possibility that these findings might be contingent on the market or technology and possibly
subject to change over time.
The contribution of this paper is to explore a simple model where communication costs are
endogenous. I revisit and generalize Arrow’s 1962 model of innovation, which assumes zero
communication costs. To this model I add a convex communication cost function, I allow fixed
investments in formalization to reduce the marginal cost of communication, and I generalize the
competition between firms using old and new technologies.
I find that the decision to formalize knowledge is associated with a variety of economic
conditions, suggesting rich patterns of behavior beyond the standard models. The intuition that drives
these results is simple: it does not pay to formalize knowledge unless the market is sufficiently large to
recoup formalization costs. Conversely, producing a large output is typically too costly unless the
technical knowledge has been formalized. This means that the decision to formalize is made jointly with
decisions about output and pricing.
In particular, unformalized knowledge will tend to be associated with markets where the new
technology coexists with the old. This is because when a new technology is not substantially better than
the old—for example, during the early stages of a technology—then firms will not formalize the new
knowledge and communication costs will act as a capacity constraint on the scale of the new technology.
Then the new technology cannot feasibly replace all of the old, that is, innovation is not drastic. Of
course, new and old technologies often coexist for sustained periods.1
1. Observers sometimes attribute this to product differentiation (e.g., Christensen 1997). Here, the
technologies can coexist even when they are perfect substitutes. Technologies also coexist when they are
embodied in durable capital goods.
3
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This is important because I show that coexistence affects the behavior of new technology firms. In
particular, if the old technology market is sufficiently competitive, then competition between new
technology firms is “soft.” New technology firms act strategically tough toward incumbent firms, but
softly toward each other. For example, the entry of other new technology firms does not dissipate their
rents, patents do not increase ex ante rents, and firms may be willing to freely exchange knowledge with
each other in some circumstances. On the other hand, when innovation is drastic, competition between
new technology firms is “hard,” patents are needed to realize maximum rents and knowledge exchange
occurs only under license or sale.
Thus behavior regarding technical knowledge can change dramatically depending on whether the
market is in a “coexistence” equilibrium or a “drastic” equilibrium and this will vary systematically with
characteristics of the market. With many industries, the quality of the new technology improves over
time (e.g., see Rosenberg 1979). When this happens (and assuming that the old technology is
competitive), the manner in which technical knowledge is acquired, protected, used to compete,
exchanged, and diffused varies systematically with the maturity of the technology. That is, some
technologies follow a sort of life cycle of technical knowledge. In the early stage (or in coexistence
equilibria more generally), knowledge is communicated via costly personal instruction, making
geographic localization, social networks, employee mobility and migration important and competition
between new technology firms soft. In later stages (or in drastic equilibria generally), knowledge is
formalized, teaching relies more on formal instruction, markets can more readily emerge for general
human capital and the interactions between new technology firms are more strategic.
In this way, endogenous communication costs give rise to rich patterns of behavior that vary
systematically with technological maturity and other market characteristics. This provides an
explanation for several apparent paradoxes:
• why pioneer inventors in some technologies such as software often do not patent and often share
knowledge, while large companies do most of the patenting in these technologies, even though
large companies presumably have substantial complementary assets and thus might not need
patents;
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• why new communication and transportation technologies facilitate the global spread of
technical knowledge needed for producing mature products, but early stage innovation often
remains highly localized in places like Silicon Valley;
• and why developing nations that have grown by mastering mature technologies often experience
a “middle income trap,” facing difficulty innovating in new technology fields and hence find it
difficult to move to the technology frontier.
These differences in behavior also have strong implications for policy. I show that while patents
increase ex ante incentives to invest in R&D in the drastic equilibrium, patents actually decrease ex ante
incentives in the coexistence equilibrium. This poses a significant difficulty for the design of a unified
patent system. It appears that some features of the patent system treat early stage technologies
appropriately, while others do not. Moreover, the free exchange of knowledge that can occur in the
coexistence equilibrium is welfare improving, suggesting that policy regarding trade secrecy, employee
non-compete agreements and immigration might all have important effects on early stage technologies.
Literature review
While the literature has touched on aspects of the costs of communicating technical knowledge, it
has not identified the connection between formalization and market competition and the implications
that follow. A large literature, of course, discusses information economics, but most of this concerns
small quantities of information, such as an agent’s private valuation. As such, this sort of information is
not costly to communicate. In contrast, technical knowledge can require much greater “bandwidth” and,
for this reason, can be costly to communicate.
Some scholars have observed that inventors can change the marginal cost of communicating
technical knowledge, for instance, by codifying it (Nelson and Winter 1982, Cowan et al. 1997,1999,
Foray 2004). This paper goes further, making the connection to market competition and drawing out
implications that communication costs have for a variety of economic behavior.
The analysis in this paper concerns the communication of technical knowledge, meaning the
detailed knowledge to design, build, install, operate and consume a technology and its products. In
contrast much of the literature on innovation and economic growth focuses instead on “ideas,” which are
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held to be non-rivalrous and non-excludable (see Romer 1990). As is well recognized, this analysis,
however useful, abstracts away from some important practical realities such as communication costs. In
this idealized depiction, ideas have zero communication costs. But in reality, what matters for
production is knowledge, not individual ideas. The technical knowledge needed to produce something
typically consists of very many ideas, not just a single idea. Moreover, some of these ideas might not
codified or articulated; some might require a specific language or other background knowledge in order
to interpret them (“absorptive capacity”); and users might need to understand not only the separate ideas,
but also how they interact. Highly formalized knowledge will be, to a first approximation, non-rivalrous
and not technically excludable, however, this is not necessarily true before knowledge has been
formalized.
For example, Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990, 1994) argue that an important part of R&D
spending is directed to building “absorptive capacity,” the knowledge needed to interpret external
knowledge and apply it to the firm’s own technology.2 Absorptive capacity is closely related to
communication cost. To the extent that external knowledge is intentionally transferred, this spending is
part of the communication cost. More generally, cumulative investments in absorptive capacity provide
background knowledge that facilitates the communication of new knowledge.
Economic models often assume fixed communication costs or fixed costs of imitation (unintended
communication), which are also often assumed to be small. My analysis complements these models,
providing an endogenous interaction that leads to richer patterns of behavior. For example, Arrow’s
1962 paper provides the starting point for both the normative theory of invention incentives (see Gallini
and Scotchmer 2001 for a review) and for much of the descriptive theory of the role of innovation in
industrial organization. Scholars, including Arrow (see 1969) have, of course, recognized that Arrow’s
assumption of negligible communication costs is not general and, for that reason, patents are not always
“needed.” However, my analysis suggests that the critical early phases of technologies will
2. Cohen and Levinthal discuss external knowledge from the public domain but they do not
distinguish whether that knowledge was willingly shared or not nor do they explicitly consider external
knowledge transactions between firms. Their analysis, in fact, applies broadly to all forms of external
knowledge.
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systematically tend to have substantial communication costs. The model in this paper extends the
standard analysis to provide some consideration of innovation policy, both patent and otherwise, for this
critical phase. Moreover, communication costs are significant not only because they provide a degree of
appropriability, but they can also change the nature of innovative competition so that inventors might
even share knowledge.
Indeed, economists have noted that inventors sometimes freely exchange knowledge, describing
this as “extremely puzzling” (Allen 1983), “novel” (von Hippel 1987), and “startling” (Lerner and Tirole
2002; see also Harhoff et al. 2003, Henkel 2006, Schrader 1991 and Stein 2008). But knowledge sharing
is only puzzling if one assumes that communication costs are negligible and that knowledge licensing is
Pareto efficient. I show that when these conditions do not hold—as they might not during the early
phase of a technology—then free knowledge exchange emerges naturally. More generally, MacLeod and
Nuvolari (2009) review some of the historical literature and find many instances where nineteenth
century inventors freely exchanged technical knowledge, including cases in important industries such as
iron and steelmaking (Allen 1983, Meyer 2003), and steam engines (Nuvolari 2004).
A related issue concerns the difference between academic science and industrial research.
Dasgupta and David (1994) highlight the different norms and incentives of these two systems. Aghion et
al. (2008) see the two sectors providing different tradeoffs between creative control and research focus.
My model complements these, suggesting that even within industry, research on early stage technologies
might exhibit academic-like behavior, with sharing of knowledge and little reliance on patents. On the
other hand, the formalization of knowledge required to publish scientific findings plays an entirely
different role than formalization in industry.
My model generates patterns similar to those described in the product life cycle literature. Vernon
(1966) hypothesizes that international production takes place only after knowledge to produce and
market a new product is sufficiently standardized. This is an example of formalization as is the
“dominant design” of Utterback and Abernathy (1975, Suárez and Utterback 1995, Utterback 1996). In
other models, the patterns are similar but the causal mechanisms might be different such as with
Christensen’s “disruptive innovation” (1997) and Meyer’s (2007) model of open source innovation that
transitions into proprietary manufacturing. Generally, very little of the product life cycle literature pays
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much specific attention to the changing nature of the transmission of knowledge. In some formal
models, such as those by Winter (1984), Klepper and Graddy (1990) and Klepper (1996), imitation
figures prominently, but the ease of imitation is exogenously fixed. In contrast to all of these models, my
model considers how the transmission of technical knowledge—both intended and imitative—might
change with technological maturity. Because of this, my model provides empirical predictions that go
beyond those of the product life cycle literature, affecting such features as geographic localization,
patent propensity and human capital acquisition.
Eric von Hippel (1994, 2005) has highlighted the importance of communication costs for the
nature of innovation. He shows that when technical knowledge is “sticky” (that is, difficult to
communicate), users of the technology tend to do the innovation themselves rather than manufacturers.
Similarly, Darby, Zucker and several co-authors find that the tacit knowledge of “star” scientists is often
critical to the success of early stage firms.3 These findings support the view that knowledge of early
technologies is often unformalized.
Foray and Steinmueller (2003, Foray 2004) point out that codification of knowledge has an added
benefit: new representations of knowledge sometimes facilitate the generation of new knowledge. For
example, the periodic table not only reduced learning costs, but it also correctly predicted the existence
of several new elements. In a similar vein, Mokyr (2002) ascribes a critical role to the generalization of
practical knowledge during the Industrial Revolution. He argues that new “epistemic” knowledge
created from such generalizations helped sustain innovation. In my model, new knowledge arises from
the exchange of knowledge, but I do not consider the facilitating role formalization might have. While
this latter role might be important, the mechanism that I highlight itself might also be critical to
sustaining innovation, especially for early stage technologies when practical knowledge is not yet highly
formalized.
Finally, the model here is related to one in Bessen and Maskin (2009). Innovative activity here is
complementary and sequential, similar to that model. The early phase of the model here corresponds to
3. Successful entrants are located near the star scientists, active participation by the scientists is positively associated
with a variety of firm performance measurements, close ties to scientists shortens the time to IPO and increases the IPO
proceeds. See Darby and Zucker (2001), Darby et al. (2001), Zucker et al. (1998, 2001), Cockburn and Henderson (1998).
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the conditions in that model that give rise to a particularly dynamic mode of innovation, so this model
can be seen as providing an explanation for why those conditions might arise in practice.
In the next section I posit three assumptions about communication costs. Then, in the following
two sections I describe a simple model and results. Section V contains four brief case studies illustrating
the relevance of the model and Section VI concludes.

II. The Cost of Communicating Technical Knowledge
Technical knowledge
Consider the information or knowledge needed to build and use a technology. For the moment,
ignore the distinction between knowledge and information. Let a technique, be a vector of n technical
parameters,

. Without loss of generality, the parameters can be binary,

vector representing the m monitored states of nature, also binary,

. Let S be a
.

A technology, T, maps each monitored state of nature to a technique,
can thus be represented by

. A technology

bits of data. This is the information measure of the technology,

.
Cost of person-to-person teaching
Now, suppose that a single teacher wants to communicate technical knowledge to L students. I
wish to assume generally that the cost of communication in this case is: 1.) proportional to the amount of
information being communicated, I(T), and is 2.) convex in the number of students.
To motivate this assumption, it is helpful to compare teaching to Claude Shannon’s model of a
noisy communication channel.4 The teacher initially broadcasts the information to her students and the
duration (cost) of this broadcast will be equal to the amount of information divided by the
communication rate. However, for a variety of reasons, the initial broadcast is received with errors.
Errors might arise from the students’ limited attention or cognition, or the imprecision of the teacher’s
language, or the difficulty of articulating the information. Students might lack the knowledge to

4. Arrow (1969) suggests this analogy.
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assimilate and understand the information they receive, that is, they might lack sufficient “absorptive
capacity” (Cohen and Levinthal 1989).
To correct these errors, each student’s knowledge must be tested and the teacher will then retransmit some portion of the information relevant to the detected errors. This process might then be
repeated. Because this error correction cycle is unique to each student, the total time required for error
correction increases with the number of students. Given limited resources for the teacher’s time, for the
classroom, equipment, etc., this means that each student generates a congestion externality. 5 Because of
this, the average time (cost) of training a student increases with the number of students in the class, L.
This assumption corresponds, of course, to the well-established empirical finding for school education
that the effectiveness of education diminishes with class size. Of course, some economies of scale or
network effects might work to reduce average costs with class size, but I assume that the combined
effect is still one of increasing average cost.
This assumption can be written formally as
Assumption 1. Costs of teaching. The total cost of communicating the knowledge of
technology T to L students is
.
The subscript “u” designates unformalized knowledge, in contrast to communicating formalized
knowledge, designated with an “f”.6
Formalized knowledge
It is possible to reduce the information measure of a technology through the use of formalized
knowledge. For an example, consider typesetting systems where the typographer needs to know how to
5. In the simplest case, students sharing the same classroom must wait while the teacher corrects the knowledge of
other students.

6. Note that this formulation assumes a single quality of knowledge. In a more realistic model, the student might have
more or fewer errors and hence more or less accurate knowledge, and additional teaching cost could communicate knowledge
more accurately.
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hyphenate words. In the most primitive form of knowledge, the typographer would need to learn the
hyphenation points of all the words he is likely to encounter. This is a large instructional burden, but
formalization of the knowledge of various sorts can reduce the learning cost:
1. Codification. Knowledge can be “expressed in a particular language and recorded on a
particular medium” (Foray 2004, p. 74). This allows the knowledge to be communicated with
less personal interaction. For example, the knowledge of hyphenation points can be codified by
putting them in a dictionary. Then, in practical terms, the typographer need only learn the
hyphenation points of the most frequently encountered words; the remaining words can be
looked up in the dictionary as needed. This reduces the information measure of the technology
from I(T) to I(T*).
2. Standardization. By limiting the range of inputs, outputs and operating conditions, the number
of states that need to be monitored can be decreased, thus decreasing the information measure of
the technology as well. In the typesetting example, standardization on a single language reduces
the information measure of the technology.
3. Modularization. By breaking the knowledge into semi-independent modules and using a
division of labor, the amount of knowledge each worker learns is less. Examples of
modularization include “innovation toolkits” (von Hippel and Katz 2002) and Application
Programming Interfaces in software.
4. Abstraction. It is possible to derive general rules for hyphenating, for example, many words that
end in “ing” can be hyphenated before that suffix. The typographer could be taught that rule
(plus exceptions), thus further reducing the information measure. This can be called algorithmic
knowledge, e.g., Donald Knuth developed a hyphenation algorithm. Abstraction is also a feature
of scientific knowledge: science reduces observational data (e.g., hundreds of years of
astronomical observation) to some simple relationships (e.g., Newton’s laws of motion) that can
be used to reproduce the observational data. This sort of abstraction also reduces the
information needed to employ technologies. For example, the periodic table and associated
techniques allowed complex craft methods of producing dyes to be replaced by chemical
synthesis of a few well-controlled steps.
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5. Embodiment/automation. The cost of communicating technical knowledge can also be reduced
by embodying that knowledge in a physical form that acts on that knowledge.7 For example,
with computers, the hyphenation dictionary (or the algorithm) can be embodied in a computer
program so that the typographer need not learn hyphenation. This also reduces the information
measure of the knowledge needed to use typesetting technology. Of course, a wide variety of
mechanical and electrical devices serve to embody technical knowledge as well as computer
programs. When this embodied knowledge is used to allow a machine to perform work
previously performed by humans, we call this automation.
There is, however, a fixed cost to formalizing knowledge. Let that cost be

. Generally, the cost

of communicating formalized knowledge, designated by subscript “f” is as follows:
Assumption 2. Costs of communicating formalized knowledge. The total cost of
communicating the knowledge of technology T to L students after that knowledge is
formalized is
.

Here the average cost per student decreases in L, at least initially. If

is large, then the variable

portion of the cost might be trivial by comparison. The marginal cost of transmission for formalized
knowledge is less than it is for unformalized knowledge, however, it is not necessarily zero, as is often
assumed.8
Note that this perhaps ignores the greater difficulty of communicating more abstract knowledge
compared to simple information. That is, with an algorithm, for instance, the ability of the student to
understand depends more on the student’s previous knowledge and experience. E.g., Newton’s laws are
not much help to recreate astronomical coordinates without knowledge of calculus. Of course, in reality,
7. With codification, the knowledge is stored in physical form. With automation, a device performs actions autonomously
based on stored knowledge.

8. In some cases, formalization might affect unit costs. For example, a typographer using a dictionary might take
extra time to look up words. To keep things simple, I assume that if formalization increases unit costs, then this increase is
included in the marginal communication cost.
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technical knowledge is never pure information, but always relies on the user’s previous experience and
knowledge to be interpreted and translated into productive activity.
More generally, I have presented the distinction between formalized and unformalized knowledge
in a highly stylized way. In a more realistic model, there would be degrees of formalization with a
schedule of different fixed costs and different information measures. Nevertheless, this simple model
helps identify some simple relationships between formalization and other economic variables. Also,
while I assume that inventors choose to formalize based on relative costs, exogenous scientific
developments can alter these costs.
Also, note that formalization not only affects the marginal cost of communicating technical
knowledge; it might also affect the qualitative nature of that communication. Unformalized knowledge
requires personal instruction and hands-on experience. The marginal cost of communicating formalized
knowledge is less, but this communication might also permit less personal interchange, especially to the
extent that abstraction and physical embodiment are involved. For example, more formalized knowledge
might be communicated through trade journals, textbooks or scientific literature.
Appropriability
Finally, communication costs affect appropriability conditions in two ways. First, imitation costs
must be at least as large as communication costs. That is, the cost of undesired communication cannot
be less than the cost of intended communication. Knowledge holders can increase the cost of unintended
communication, for example, by taking measures to keep the knowledge secret. Survey evidence
suggests that these costs can be substantial (Mansfield et al. 1981, Levin et al. 1987). For this reason,
high communication costs imply a high degree of excludability.
To capture this notion in a simple way, I assume that imitation costs are

Comparing this to Assumptions 1 and 2 above, the first term represents the variable component of
communication costs. This equals communication costs for unformalized knowledge; for formalized
knowledge it equals communication costs less

. Described in this way, imitation costs are typically

much less for formalized knowledge than for unformalized knowledge. Consequently, free-riding might

13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698802

be more of a problem for formalized knowledge, while unformalized knowledge might have significant
excludability.
Second, the ability of patents to perform as efficient property rights also varies with formalization.
This is because formalized knowledge is easier to describe and this characteristic is important for the
clear delineation of the boundaries of property rights. Efficient operation of a patent rights system (or
any property rights system) depends on predictable boundaries (Bessen and Meurer 2008).
Unpredictability raises dispute risk and transaction costs. Indeed, several patent law doctrines
(definiteness, enablement and written description requirements) can be interpreted as requirements that
the patented knowledge is sufficiently formalized. And patent offices sometimes struggle to understand
early stage technologies where the knowledge is often not highly formalized and therefore difficult for
patent examiners to learn. All this suggests that transaction costs and dispute risks might be greater for
unformalized knowledge.

III. Basic Model
The model is a generalization of Arrow’s (1962) model of a cost-reducing innovation that is a
perfect substitute for an existing technology. I assume that a worker can produce a single unit of output
with the existing technology. Given total output, X, let price, p, be determined by p(X), the continuous,
twice differentiable inverse demand function,

with elasticity

. To simplify the proofs, I assume that this elasticity is constant.
Suppose that there are N firms producing with the old technology and that there are M prospective
inventors who can develop versions of the new technology. Only these M inventors have the
accumulated knowledge and experience with the new technology to possibly bring it into production. If
the ith prospective inventor invests R in R&D, that inventor can produce output with a version of the
new technology that has quality or efficiency qi > 0. I assume that the outcome of R&D is uncertain. In
particular, the quality of technology, qi, is determined as a random draw from continuous, differentiable
cumulative distribution function F(q), with lower support zero, unbounded upper support and finite
mean. This distribution is common knowledge.
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This technology quality represents the number of units of output that a single worker can produce
so that firm output is

with trained labor Li. If qi > 1, the new technology requires less labor to

produce a unit of output than the old technology and is thus cost-reducing. A more general model might
allow the new technology to be differentiated from the old and, in general, product differentiation would
soften competition. I wish to focus on a situation where the output of the new technology is a perfect
substitute for the old output in order to highlight the effects of communication costs on softening
competition.
I initially assume that inventors do not patent. Then the ith inventor’s knowledge of her new
technology can be transferred to others as follows:
1. Inventors can choose to exchange knowledge of their technologies with each other. Since the
inventors already have deep knowledge of the technology by virtue of their investments, it
should cost little for them to communicate the differences between their technologies to each
other. I assume, without significant loss of generality, that knowledge exchange among
inventors is costless. I initially assume that inventors efficiently exchange knowledge,
coordinating on the most efficient technology with quality

. This

allows for innovative complementarity, that is, by combining knowledge, inventors can derive a
technique that is superior to any of their individual techniques.
2. The ith inventor trains Li workers at a cost of cu(Li) or cf(Li), depending on whether the inventor
chooses to formalize the knowledge or not. I assume that this knowledge is firm-specific, so that
it is paid for by the employers and all workers, both in the old and new sector, receive wage w.
It can be shown that the model generates the same results with general human capital (details
available from author).
3. Third parties can copy the technology and train L workers at an imitation cost of C(L). I will
initially assume that imitation costs are so high that imitators never enter.

Below I will relax these initial assumptions and consider the role of patents, imitation, and
knowledge transactions explicitly. Actions of the inventors and firms can be captured in a game with the
following stages:
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1. Each inventor chooses whether to spend R on research and development.
2. If the ith inventor invests, she draws technology with quality qi, and these values are common
knowledge.
3. Inventors can exchange technical knowledge by freely exchanging it or under licensing
agreements. I initially assume that this exchange is costless and efficient, coordinating on the
best available technology with quality q.
4. Each inventor chooses the number of workers to train and trains them. Imitators choose whether
to enter and train workers also.
5. With output capacities determined by the numbers of trained workers, the firms, including the
firms using the old technology, produce, set prices and sell.
I focus on groupwise symmetric Nash equilibria (symmetric among the N old firms and among the
M new firms). Note that because I have modeled only a single period, there is no opportunity for
strategic behavior around formalizing knowledge; the decision to formalize depends only on the least
cost method of training the current workforce. Clearly a richer model might give rise to strategic
investment in formalization and possibly a sort of standards competition.

IV. Basic Results
Formalization decision
For simplicity, I discuss results for the case where there are only two inventors, M = 2. The results
can readily be expanded to the general case, but exposition is simpler with only two. I will index the two
new technology firms as i = 1,2, and the old technology firms as i = 3,...,N+2 and, for ease of exposition,
I treat L as a continuous variable. I look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria that are groupwise
symmetric, solving by backward induction. In the last stage, prices are set given the numbers of workers
trained in stage 4. If both new technology firms invest at stage 1, they simultaneously choose the
number of workers to train in stage 4.
Consider the game when both new technology firms invest at the first stage. Then total output is
and firm profits for the new and old firms respectively are
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(1a)
(1b)
From this, assuming a group-wise symmetric equilibrium, the first order conditions for an interior
solution are

(2a)

(2b)

where s is the share of total output produced by each new technology firm, L* is the labor trained by
each new technology firm and j is chosen as the least cost form of training.
First, consider the formalization decision as the number of workers per firm grows larger. Clearly,
at very small values of Li, unformalized knowledge will cost less because

but

. However, the marginal cost of unformalized training is always larger, so as Li increases, at some point,
Lf, formalized training will cost less. Furthermore, L* increases with q, at least as long as N is
sufficiently large (see Appendix). This means that a unique value of q corresponds to Lf. Call this value
qf. Then
Proposition 1. Formalization. As long as the optimal number of workers, L*, for the new
technology firms is small, specifically, as long as L*< Lf, firms will not formalize
knowledge. Similarly, if N is sufficiently large and q < qf, then new technology firms will
not formalize knowledge.
In simpler words, it does not pay to formalize unless the upfront cost of formalizing can be
amortized over a sufficiently large number of workers. This is shown in Figure 1, which displays how
training costs might vary with technology quality, q. The cost of unformalized training begins increasing
from zero at the point where new technology firms can first profitably enter (discussed below). The cost
of formalized training begins at a higher level, thanks to the fixed upfront cost, but then increases more
slowly and is eventually overtaken at qf.
Note that the competitiveness of the old technology market, as represented by the number of
firms, N, can affect the formalization decision of the new technology firms. When a competitive market
in the old technology coexists with the new technology, small changes in L* do not affect the market
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price. Then increases in technology quality, q, increase L*. However, when there are only a few old
technology firms, changes in q might decrease L*, depending on the elasticity of demand.
Coexistence
The nature of the equilibrium solutions depend on various parameters, most significantly
technology quality, q. Different parameter values define different solution regions. I derive the threshold
conditions for each region in the Appendix and just highlight the regions here.
First, unless the technology quality is sufficiently large, specifically unless q > qe, where qe < 1,
new technology firms will not find it profitable to enter.
Second, if technology quality is even larger, specifically if q > qd, where qd > 1, innovation will
be “drastic,” that is, the old technology firms will drop out of the market because the new technology
firms charge a price that is less than the unit cost of the old technology. This happens when the duopoly
price is less than the wage, w. This region corresponds to Arrow’s (1962) drastic innovation, except here
it is for a duopoly instead of a monopoly.
The various regions from these two thresholds are also shown in Figure 1. Below qe, new
technology firms do not enter. As q increases above qe but remains below qd, the new technology firms
enter and coexist with the old technology firms. At even better levels of technology quality, the old
technology firms drop out. Note that these regions imply that formalization is loosely correlated with
drastic innovation. At low levels of q, knowledge is unformalized and the technologies coexist; at
sufficiently high levels of q, knowledge is formalized and innovation is drastic. In between there is a
mixed area, but the existence of these two combinations is quite general, as we shall see below.
In some cases, there might also be a region where the new technology firms set a limit price. That
is, the duopoly price might be larger than w, but the new technology firms nevertheless make out better
by charging a price of w (or slightly less), driving the old technology firms out of the market. This limit
price region occurs when q > ql, where ql > 1. Arrow (1962) called this behavior “nondrastic
innovation,” but in the context here it might be more accurately described as a limit priced region.
Putting these regions together, we get
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Proposition 2. Coexistence. With N firms possessing the old technology and 2 firms
possessing the new technology of quality q,
a. If
, where
, then a unique groupwise symmetric
“coexistence” equilibrium exists where the old and new technologies are both used.
b. Firms will not formalize knowledge in some portion of this region. For N sufficiently
large, old and new technologies will coexist and knowledge will by unformalized in the
region
.
c. For qu < q, the old technology will no longer by used.
Thus, in general, a region will exist where old and new technologies coexist and where knowledge
is unformalized. Note that new technology firms will enter even when the new technology is inferior to
the old, in contrast to the common assumption that new, inferior technologies only appear when they
address a differentiated market (e.g., Christensen 1997). Here, even without product differentiation, new
technology firms can enter because the old technology firms charge an oligopoly price that exceeds cost.
When the number of old technology firms grows sufficiently large, this possibility vanishes in the limit.
The generality of coexistence depends on the presence of positive communication costs.
Specifically,
Proposition 3. If communication costs, c, are zero, then
range of the coexistence equilibrium vanishes as N grows large.

, so that the

The proof is in the Appendix, but this result follows from two simple intuitions. First, as just
noted, as N grows large, new technology firms cannot enter until the new technology is at least as
efficient as the old. Second, without communication costs, new technology firms can limit price as long
as the new technology is more efficient than the old. On the other hand, when communication costs are
positive and knowledge is not formalized, these costs act as a capacity constraint. If the capacity
constraint binds sufficiently, then the new technology firms cannot limit price until their technology
reaches quality ql. That is, for less efficient technologies, they cannot scale up sufficiently to make limit
pricing a profitable strategy.
The various solution regions are shown in Table 1 with some illustrative examples that I discuss
below. Early on, new technology of weaving, dyeing and wireless communications coexisted with older
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technologies and relatively little knowledge was formalized. Before 1909 in aviation and before 1977
with ACE inhibiting blood pressure medications (Cockburn and Henderson 1994), innovators worked as
researchers, without any commercial products or services. With mature technologies, knowledge was
formalized and commercial activity took place at a large scale.
Because communication costs constrain capacity, they generate a non-null coexistence region
even when the old technology market is highly competitive. Of course, in practice, other sorts of
capacity constraints such as a limited supply of critical skilled labor sometimes play a similar role.
Nevertheless, communication costs with unformalized knowledge are significant because they likely
provide a rather general constraint on capacity for marginally advantageous new technologies, such as
for early stage technologies.
The general existence of a coexistence equilibrium is important because it changes the nature of
competition between firms using the new technology, including innovation incentives. To show this, I
will focus here and in the remainder of the paper on the case where the number of old technology firms
is large. There are, of course, important cases where the market for the old technology is not so
competitive, however, it is difficult to obtain general analytical results for those cases.
From Proposition 2b there will generally be a coexistence equilibrium with unformalized
knowledge. I contrast this competitive/unformalized equilibrium with a drastic equilibrium (q > qd) with
formalized knowledge, assuming that the market is sufficiently large to support formalization.
Moreover, to keep things simple, I assume that for this drastic equilibrium the marginal cost of
communication is so small that it can be ignored. This drastic/formalized case thus corresponds to the
conditions often imposed in the literature. Clearly, not all industries and technologies fall into one of
these two cases, however, as I discuss below, evidence suggests that they are both common enough and
this stylized treatment highlights important differences in behavior.
In this regard, it is important to reiterate that I have modeled only one period and not an entire
technological trajectory of sequential innovation. One can surmise that in a more general model,
behavior would be shaped by expectations of future conditions. For example, if a large scale market is
anticipated in the near future, firms might invest in formalizing knowledge even though that might be
unprofitable at the current quality level of technology. That is, there might well be a transition region
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where firms behave as if they were in the drastic/formalized equilibrium. Nevertheless, even taking such
considerations into account, many technologies go through decades of development before knowledge
becomes highly formalized. Kitch’s data (1977) show a mean delay of 29 years from first patentability
of a technology to first commercialization; Gort and Klepper (1982) find a mean delay of another 29
years from first commercialization to the beginning of the "shakeout" phase. Thus even taking transition
behavior into account, there is ample time for technologies to be in an unformalized/coexistence
equilibrium for many years.
Old technology market and strategic interaction
In particular, new technology firms interact very differently in these two equilibria. Consider, for
example, how each firm’s technology influences the willingness of the other firm to exchange
technology. Suppose, for the moment, that firms have not yet exchanged knowledge in stage 3. Let
represent the equilibrium profit of the ith new technology firm at stage 2, before
knowledge exchange.
Proposition 4. Strategic Interaction.
a. For the drastic equilibrium with zero marginal communication costs,

and

.
b. For the coexistence equilibrium with unformalized knowledge,
but

.

The proof is in the Appendix. As I develop below, this difference in behavior is at the root of
differences in regard to the effect of patents and the free exchange of knowledge. In both equilibria, each
new technology firm benefits from improvements to its own technology. However, each firm suffers
from improvements to its rival’s technology in the drastic equilibrium, but not in the competitive
coexistence equilibrium. The drastic case corresponds to the standard intuition. Improvements to the
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rival technology increase the rival’s market share and decrease the price in the drastic equilibrium. The
rival becomes a tougher competitor with better technology.
However, in the competitive coexistence equilibrium, an improvement to the rival’s technology
will spur the rival to increase its market share, but, thanks to the competition from the old technology
firms, the market price will not change. This means that each new technology firm will be unaffected by
improvements to its rival’s technology. The rival’s increase in market share comes only at the expense
of the old technology firms.
Thus three-way competition changes the nature of competition between new technology firms.
Note that this result depends on a competitive market for the old technology. It might not obtain if, say,
the market for the old technology were a monopoly. In that case, the market price would change, in
general, affecting all firms. Thus this result puts a new twist on the Schumpeterian argument about the
relative importance of competition and monopoly for innovation. Here, even when the incumbents do
not innovate, technology competition differs depending on whether the incumbent market is a monopoly
or is competitive.
Innovation incentives without patents
An inventor will choose to invest in stage 1 if the expected profits exceed the cost of
innovation, R. The nature of the rents also differs between the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium and
the drastic/formalized equilibrium. Substituting (2a) back into (1a), for interior solutions, the optimal
rents equal

(3)

where γ is the elasticity of the average teaching cost per student. The first term represents a markup over
cost, wL + c. The second term can be interpreted as oligopsony rents earned on human capital. For the
drastic/formalized equilibrium, γ equals zero, so the entire rent derives from the markup over cost, as in
standard models. For the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium, on the other hand, profits come largely
from rents on human capital. This is because s will generally be small in this region—market share, s,
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equals zero when q equals qe, and it increases as q grows within this region. When market share is zero,
the first term drops out.
The stage 1 investment decision with these rents can be compared to the social planner’s secondbest decision on whether to invest. It will be socially desirable to invest in stage 1 when the net change
in social welfare exceeds innovation cost R. Consider the situation where the number of old technology
firms, N, is asymptotically large. Then the pre-innovation price will equal the cost, w.
In the case of a drastic innovation, the new duopoly price will be less than w and the social
planner will want to charge a lower price. As in the standard analysis, the net change in social welfare
will consist of the additional consumer surplus from the drop in price, the duopoly profits of the new
technology firms and a deadweight loss. In general, the profit of each firm will be less than the net
social welfare and therefore the innovation incentive will be less than socially optimal. There will be
some socially desirable innovations that are not profitable enough for inventors to invest.
On the other hand, when the innovation falls into the coexistence/unformalized range, the market
price remains unchanged and the net social welfare is the cost savings realized by the new technology
firms,

leading to first order maximizing condition

. This is the same as first order

condition (2a) when market share, s, is zero. Thus
Proposition 5. When knowledge exchange is Pareto efficient, when the number of old
technology firms, N, is asymptotically large and when the market share of a new
technology firm, s, is asymptotically small, private rents equal net social welfare in the
coexistence equilibrium, generating socially optimal levels of investment in innovation.
In effect, private innovation incentives in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium will
be approximately socially optimal when the old technology market is competitive. The intuition behind
this result is that rents do not dissipate to consumers in this setting and there is no deadweight loss
because the market price remains unchanged. I have derived this result under the assumptions that

23
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698802

knowledge exchange is Pareto efficient and that imitation costs are high; below I show that this result
can hold even when these two assumptions are relaxed. Also, I have excluded dynamic considerations;
the social planner might want a greater level of investment if formalization is expected to occur in the
near future.
Innovation incentives with patents
For a similar reason to Proposition 5, patents do not significantly increase innovation incentives in
the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium. The usual argument is that innovation incentives are larger in
a monopoly than a duopoly because more rents dissipate to consumers in duopoly. Consider the effect of
a broad patent that gives one new technology firm the power to exclude the other from the market.
Assume that: 1.) each firm has a fifty percent chance of winning the patent ex ante (stage 1) as long as
they both invest R, and 2.) that the patent holder and the other firm can agree to a patent license that
earns joint profits equal to the monopoly rent. For the moment, I maintain the assumption that Pareto
efficient knowledge exchange occurs in stage 3, allowing both firms to coordinate on the best
technology with or without patents. In the drastic/formalized equilibrium, a straightforward calculation
shows that the monopoly profit exceeds twice the duopoly rents. That is, the joint profit is greater with a
broad patent. Since each firm has a a 50:50 change of winning the patent ex ante, its expected rents are
half the monopoly rent, which is larger than the duopoly rent. Based on this standard reasoning, a broad
patent will provide greater ex ante incentive to invest in innovation.
However, when the new technology is introduced into a competitive market, a firm with a broad
patent on the new technology can exclude the other new technology firm, but not the old technology
firms.9 From Proposition 4, above, one firm’s profit is unaffected by the other’s technology in a
competitive coexistence equilibrium. In this case, a patent does not increase joint profits. Even if the
patentee hired the other inventor to train workers, the combined profits would not exceed twice the
duopoly profit. Moreover, to the extent that patents impose costs on innovators—because of fees, legal

9. In general, the old technology would normally count as prior art so that a patent on the new
technology could not read against the old.
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costs, enforcement costs and litigation costs for defendants—joint profits will necessarily be less in the
coexistence equilibrium under a patent regime. Hence,
Proposition 6. Patents and incentives. Assuming efficient knowledge exchange, a broad
patent increases ex ante innovation incentives in the drastic/formalized equilibrium, but not
in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium. To the extent that patents impose costs on
innovators, ex ante incentives in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium are strictly lower
under a patent regime.
Note that patents are privately valuable in the coexistence equilibrium as long as patent costs are
not too great. This is because the innovator with the superior technology can profitably license the patent
in Stage 3.10 However, because the innovators do not know ex ante who will have the superior
technology, this ex post private value does not increase ex ante expected rents. Thus under these
conditions, patents will be privately beneficial but socially welfare reducing.
Of course, I have assumed high imitation costs, C, so that free-riding is not an issue. However,
this result holds even if this assumption is weakened, as long as the imitation cost still exceeds the cost
of intentional learning for unformalized knowledge,

. This is because for small values

of q, an imitator cannot profitably enter. Specifically, let qi be the value of q that solves

. At

this value, an imitator makes zero profits; at smaller values, an imitator would make negative profits and
so does not enter. Then the range of the coexistence/formalized equilibrium can simply be redefined as
. In other words, even with imitation, a coexistence/formalized equilibrium
still exists as long as imitation costs are positive. In this region, Propositions 5 and 6 hold. The effect of
imitation is to possibly reduce the range of this equilibrium, but not to change behavior within the
region. The actual extent of the coexistence region is, of course, an empirical matter. Free-riding
remains a problem outside of this region, especially because imitation costs might be particularly low
when knowledge is formalized.
These results also depend on the strong assumption that knowledge exchange is Pareto efficient. I
relax this assumption in the next section. These results also do not consider dynamic behavior as

10. Technology can be licensed without patents, of course, but to the extent that patents facilitate profitable licensing,
they will be privately valuable.
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discussed above. In a dynamic model, patents likely increase innovation incentives during the transition
period when formalization is expected in the near future.
Inefficient bargaining and free exchange
It often happens that innovations are complementary, meaning that if innovators exchange
knowledge they can derive a new technique that is superior to both of their individual techniques.
Suppose that by exchanging knowledge inventors can realize a superior technology of quality q such
that

. In this case, knowledge exchange is socially desirable. Without Pareto efficient

exchange, innovation incentives will be socially insufficient because firm profits will generally be
smaller if the firms do not have access to the best technology. Thus the assumption of Pareto efficient
exchange is important for Propositions 5 and 6.
From Proposition 4, in the drastic/formalized equilibrium, firms will not necessarily want to
exchange knowledge without compensation because this could reduce their profits. In this case, there is
a knowledge externality. In the standard Coasean analysis, patents permit firms to transact over
knowledge exchange for a license fee. This facilitates Pareto efficient exchange, “internalizing” the
externality, as long as transaction costs are negligible. Thus patents might be important for increasing
the returns to innovation in the drastic/formalized equilibrium not only by providing greater market
power, but also by facilitating coordination on the best technology.
However, this logic does not apply in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium. From Proposition
4 for the competitive equilibrium,

, so it is privately

beneficial to both parties to freely exchange knowledge even if the innovative complementarity (q - q1)
is small. By comparison, for the drastic equilibrium this is generally not true and firm 1 will find free
exchange beneficial only with a large innovative complementarity if at all. Thus
Proposition 7. Private returns to knowledge exchange. If the technology realized by
exchanging knowledge has quality
, then when a large number, N, of old
technology firms compete and knowledge is unformalized, new technology firms privately
benefit from exchanging knowledge even if
is small.
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This means that Pareto efficient exchange should take place in the coexistence/unformalized
equilibrium (assuming that the old technology market is competitive) even without patents. With patent
licensing, or with technology licensing negotiations more generally, bargaining might fail in the
presence of transaction costs or asymmetric information. When this occurs in a competitive coexistence
equilibrium, firms will still find it profitable to freely exchange information. Thus Propositions 5 should
hold generally for the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium, with or without patents and with or without
transaction costs. Similarly, as in Proposition 6, in the presence of transaction costs, patents will still be
welfare-reducing in the coexistence/unformalized equilibrium.
Note that I am specifically discussing mutual exchange as opposed to unilateral sharing of
knowledge. I assume that during exchange, each party can detect whether the other party is sharing
knowledge and terminate the exchange if the other party fails to share. At worst, only partial knowledge
will have been exchanged and incomplete knowledge might well be useless. Of course, if mutual
exchange is beneficial in a repeated game, then inventors might be willing to unilaterally share
knowledge, expecting reciprocal sharing in the future.
Nevertheless, this result goes against the conventional wisdom that free exchange of knowledge
between inventors is surprising. That wisdom appears to depend on an assumption that a firm is harmed
by improvements to a competitor’s technology, but, as Proposition 4 shows, that assumption does not
apply in all conditions. Free knowledge exchange occurs even when patents are available but when
bargaining over a patent license (or sale) fails. This means that such bargaining failure does not
necessarily reduce innovation incentives. Under these specific conditions of a competitive coexistence
equilibrium with unformalized knowledge, there is no “anti-commons” (Heller and Eisenberg 1998). As
I discuss below, these conditions seem to apply to some early stage technologies, but not to all
technologies.
Thus patents play a very different role in a competitive coexistence equilibrium than in the drastic
equilibrium and in much of the patent literature. In the competitive coexistence equilibrium with
unformalized knowledge, patents do nothing to increase innovation incentives and optimal incentives
are realized without patents. When patents are available in markets with these characteristics, bargaining
failure might not be a problem, but unpredictable patent boundaries might be.
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Finally, I have discussed knowledge exchange as a communication from one inventor to another,
one firm to another. However, historically much knowledge has been exchanged by employees moving
from one firm to another (Epstein 1998, Hilaire-Perez and Verna 2006, Jeremy 1981). Trade secrecy
laws, laws providing strong enforcement of employee non-compete agreements, and other laws can
prevent the free exchange of knowledge. Transactions can still take place—for example, an employee
bound by a strong non-compete agreement could pay to be released from the employment contract (or
their prospective new employer could). But to the extent that asymmetric information, transaction costs,
etc. limit such transactions, knowledge exchange could be curtailed.
Other means of appropriation
Firms can often take private action to appropriate greater returns from innovation. Even without
patents, new technology firms can merge, subject, perhaps, to antitrust regulations. Firms can also form
patent pools or they can buy out others’ patents—that is, they can build patent thickets—to create de
facto broad patent coverage with greater market power.
However, technological maturity might affect the benefits of taking such actions. Because
communication costs constrain the market for the new technology in the coexistence equilibrium,
monopoly control of the new technology might not deliver any greater market power then, following
from Proposition 4. On the other hand, if merging does not incur large transaction costs, then this might
be advantageous in a drastic equilibrium. Similarly, in the drastic equilibrium, a firm can also benefit
from buying its competitors’ patents or amassing market power through a large number of overlapping
patents generally. A firm establishing a dominant patent position in this way is said to build a patent
“thicket.” But note that the motivation to do so only exists during the drastic equilibrium when output is
not constrained by communication costs. To the extent that the drastic equilibrium is associated with
mature technologies, firms’ propensity to patent should be larger with mature technologies, all else
equal.
This might help explain the persistent relationship between early stage innovation and small
entrepreneurs. While entrepreneurs without critical complementary assets might need patents or other
strong appropriability to profit with mature technologies (Teece 1986), entrepreneurs lacking those
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assets, and perhaps even lacking patents, are not at a particular disadvantage during the early phase of a
technology. However, to the extent that firms practicing the old technology have patents that read on the
new technology, patents can serve to block entry to some degree.
Patent pools can serve a similar function to patent thickets if pooling serves to increase the joint
market power of participants. But patent pools can also serve as a means to exchange knowledge, much
like a licensing agreement (see Meyer 2003 on the Bessemer pool). While a licensing agreement
facilitates exchange between two parties, a patent pool can facilitate exchange between multiple parties
with complementary technologies. Many patent pools have, in fact, formed early in the life of a
technology when rivals had blocking patents on complementary technologies (e.g., the sewing machine
pool, see Lampe and Moser 2009).

V. Case Studies
A variety of casual evidence suggests the importance of formalization. Industry and technical
trade publications, conferences and meetings regularly feature exchange of newly codified knowledge
gleaned from working with new technologies and this has been a feature of industrial life at least since
the nineteenth century (Nuvolari 2004, Mokyr 2002). Standardization of new products and processes is
regularly part of the commercialization process, formal industry standards bodies play a critical role in
many technologies such as the Internet, and many firms pursue “platform strategies” attempting to
develop de facto standards. Much innovative activity is directed to embodying technical knowledge in
hardware or software to automate it. For example, much information technology has embodied routine
knowledge.
The core finding of the above model is that major instances of formalization of knowledge should
be associated with changes in the scale of operations and business models, including how firms choose
to protect and/or share knowledge. Several brief case studies are illustrative:

Synthetic dyes. The development of the periodic table, basic techniques of organic synthesis and an
understanding of the structure of the benzene ring in the 1860s changed the nature of chemistry
education and research, particularly for research on synthetic dyes. This formalization of knowledge

29
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698802

permitted the expansion scientific chemical training, especially in Germany where the number of
students in the chemistry labs of the universities and polytechnic schools grew rapidly to 20,000 by 1900
(Haber 1958, Bensaude-Vincent and Stengers 1996). This, in turn, facilitated the growth of large R&D
labs in the German chemical industry and large scale research programs such as the thirty year research
project to synthesize indigo. This change was also associated with a change in knowledge strategy.
Moser (2007) documents that this transition was marked by a sharp increase in the share of chemical
innovations that were patented. Figure 2A shows the sharp increase in the number of patents in force.
Also, consistent with the notion that unformalized knowledge tends to be acquired by personal
instruction, Moser finds that the change in chemical knowledge during the 1860s is associated with a
greater geographic dispersion of chemical innovation.11
Digital mobile phones. The first widely used standard for digital mobile phones, GSM, was announced
in 1987 and formalized in 1991. Other standards for digital cellphones emerged around that time (IS-54
in 1990 and IS-95 in 1995). The superior performance of digital phones on these standards facilitated
rapid growth of the cellphone industry. These standards were also associated with a change in
knowledge strategies of firms in the digital wireless communications industry. Beginning in 1962, firms
used this technology for satellite communications. They primarily worked as contractors or consultants
to the military and NASA. At that time, innovators freely exchanged knowledge. For example, Andrew
Viterbi did not patent his decoding algorithm, used widely in cellphones today, choosing to share it
instead.12 Much key knowledge was published in academic papers. Beginning in the late 1980s, firms
such as Qualcomm (which Viterbi co-founded) and Motorola, patented heavily and pursued aggressive

11. Some evidence suggests that this pattern might be more general. Teece (1977) documents that the cost of
transferring mechanical technologies overseas by multinational firms decreases substantially with the age of the technology.
Vernon (1966) cites evidence that firms do not export a technology until it has matured and is relatively standardized. Using
patent citations as a proxy for knowledge spillovers, Jaffe et al. (1993) find that the localization of knowledge decreases with
the age of a technology. Audretsch and Feldman (1996) find that early stage industries tend to be more highly localized and
Desmet and Rossi-Hansberg (2009) find that older manufacturing technologies are less localized. Thus more mature
technologies often seem to have lower communication costs and seem to diffuse more widely.
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patent strategies (West 2008, Bekkers et al. 2002). For example, once the GSM standard-setting process
was begun in 1987, participating companies raced to develop patents that would be included in the
standard. Again, Figure 2 shows a sharp increase in patenting.
Heavier-than-air flight. Around 1908, after many decades of experimentation, a “dominant design”
emerged for aircraft that identified the key design elements needed to make heavier-than-air flight
feasible. This permitted the development of military aviation and later the commercial aviation market
in the 1930s. The dominant design also lead to a sharp change in the knowledge strategies of innovators.
Before, an international network of experimenters, including the Wright brothers, actively exchanged
knowledge. Afterwards, some innovators, especially the Wright brothers, became secretive and began
aggressive patenting (Meyer 2010).13 This quickly lead to a situation of blocking patents, prompting the
War Department to encourage creation of a patent pool.
The automatic loom. In 1895 the Draper Company introduced the Northrop automatic loom, which
automated key tasks that had not been automated on previous power looms. This loom represented a
greater degree of formalization both because it was a dominant design and because it reduced the
amount of knowledge that a weaver needed to acquire.
Prior to this product, manufacturers produced power looms in a competitive market based on
common technology. In 1814, Francis Cabot Lowell built the first commercially successful power loom
in the US, followed three years later by William Gilmour. Both copied British designs, but both had to
develop considerable knowledge anew — it took Gilmour over a year to complete his loom and even
then he could not get it to work without the help of an experienced English weaver who knew how to
operate the new machine (Bagnall 1893). Lowell patented his loom but Gilmour did not at first.
Although Lowell’s company sold patent licenses and sold some patented looms, only about 4% of their
profits during the early years came from these activities, which they abandoned after a few years. Most
of their profits came, instead, from their own production of cloth using the new technology (calculations
available from the author). Gilmour, instead of patenting his design, freely shared it with other
12. “If we had patented, it probably would have slowed down its acceptance, because no one patented in those days.
AT&T and IBM patented for commercial reasons, but we were a small government contractor. (Viterbi 2008)

13. Others, such as Curtiss, patented, but also allowed other innovators to freely use their inventions (Shulman 2002).
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mechanics. He and they went into the service business of custom building looms for manufacturers
(Bagnall 1893). This behavior was not unusual: many mechanics of this time freely exchanged
knowledge among members of their networks even when they obtained patents (Meyer 2006, Thomson
2009, Wallace 1978). Gilmour’s design proved to be superior and was adopted by Lowell’s company
after a few years (Gibb 1950). This set the pattern for the loom building industry where textile
manufacturers contracted for looms or developed the resources to build looms inhouse. Although many
loom designs were freely exchanged, textile manufacturers nevertheless made persistently high profits
for many decades because much of the unformalized knowledge of how to install, maintain and operate
the new technology remained in short supply (Zevin 1971).
By 1895, this operational knowledge was much more formalized thanks to larger numbers of
experienced personnel, the formation in 1865 of an industry trade association that published much
practical knowledge, and the establishment of textile schools beginning in 1884. The Draper loom
further formalized knowledge by automating key tasks, thus reducing the knowledge needed to be
acquired by weavers. For this reason, the Draper loom quickly dominated sales to new mills in the U.S.
South, which lacked an experienced textile workforce. At this time, the Draper Company engaged in an
aggressive patent strategy, acquiring over 2,000 patents that covered a wide range of substitute
technologies (Mass 1989). With this, they dominated the industry well into the twentieth century. A
surge in patenting is seen in Figure 2, but note that this largely represents a change in patenting
behavior, not an dramatic increase in innovation — there is a long record of important innovations
before 1895 (Bessen 2011).
*

*

*

While these case studies illustrate behavior consistent with the model, they are not necessarily
representative of industry generally nor do they exhaust the patterns of behavior that are consistent with
the model. Some technologies are inherently niche technologies because their applications are limited in
scale. For example, steel minimills, which depend on limited supplies of recycled steel, operate as pricetakers. Consistent with the model, they also engage in free exchange of know-how (von Hippel 1987,
Schrader 1991). In other cases, the initial commercialization of some technologies occurs at sufficiently
large scale to permit extensive formalization. For example, ACE inhibitor blood pressure medications
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went from a “pre-competitive” stage, where research was shared in academic publications, to a largescale commercial phase, where knowledge was protected with patents (Cockburn and Henderson 1994).
In effect, much of the technical knowledge required to use these new drugs safely and effectively was
formalized during clinical trials. In other cases, innovators might not benefit from exchanging
knowledge even in early stage technologies because there might not be significant complementarities.
This seems to have been the case with the manufacture of gunpowder in the United States (Fisk 2009).
On the other hand, Open Source licensing means that knowledge exchange continues for mature
technologies such as Unix. Thus a rich variety of behavior appears to be consistent with the model,
highlighting the importance of knowledge formalization.

VI. Conclusion
The simple notion that private parties can make investments that reduce the cost of
communicating technical knowledge has a rich set of implications for economic behavior: it affects the
nature of competition and human capital acquisition, the role of small firms, the use of patents and the
free exchange of knowledge.
More generally, this analysis suggests that technological maturity might have importance for a
variety of fields of study. For example, some scholars posit that technical knowledge defines the
boundaries of the firm because some knowledge can be exchanged better within firms (e.g., Kogut and
Zander 1992). Yet the returns to technical knowledge and the nature of knowledge exchange—and the
effectiveness of extra-firm exchange, including licensing markets—changes with technological maturity,
affecting mergers, make-or-buy decisions, the significance of entrepreneurs and more. Formalization
might also affect the degree of decentralization within a firm.
Also, communication costs might help explain the apparent paradox that innovation with new
technologies often appears to be highly localized despite dramatic improvements in telecommunications
technology and the globalization of production. Close personal communication appears to be
particularly important for unformalized early technologies, possibly explaining this pattern.
Similarly, the corresponding implication for economic growth is that it might be important to
foster growth in both early and late phase industries. Nations that can foster the development of new

33
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1698802

technologies in both phases might be at a significant competitive advantage to nations that are
specialized in mature technologies. This might explain the difficulty some nations have in moving out of
a “middle income trap” (Gill and Kharas 2009).
Moreover, this analysis of communication costs poses a challenge for innovation policy. Most of
the economic theory of innovation has assumed negligible communication cost and therefore it really
only applies to mature technologies. This theory provides little practical policy guidance for early stage
innovation. The patent system has the difficult task of handling not only very different types of
technologies, but technologies at different stages of maturity all within a unified legal framework.
Intuitions about patents that are true for mature technologies, might be detrimental for early
technologies. For instance, some judges and legal scholars have argued that early stage technologies
should have broad patent scope (Kitch 1977, Kieff 2001). But the analysis here suggests that this
approach is ill-founded. More generally, other areas of policy such as trade secrecy law and the law
regulating employee non-compete agreements might be arguably more important than patents for early
stage technologies. A specific focus on policy for early stage technologies is important because without
adequate incentives early on, the profitable mature stages might never be reached or perhaps reached
only after a long delay.

Appendix
Proposition 1
The cost of unformalized training will equal the cost of formalized training when L = Lf, which solves
. It is straightforward to show that this solves to a unique
positive value. Also, taking the derivatives,
for positive values of L. This means that
f
when L exceeds L , formalized training will cost less and not otherwise. Thus inventors formalize
knowledge when L > Lf and not otherwise.
To complete the proof I will next show that the optimal value of L increase with q when N is
asymptotically large. First, taking the limit of (2b) as N becomes infinite, p = w. This means that total
output is X0 such that
. Each inventor’s share of output is then
. Also,
plugging the price of w into (2a) and solving for s, yields
(A1)
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Treating L* as a function of q, taking the derivative of both sides with respect to q, and solving for
yields
(A2)

.

Substituting from (2a)
(A3)
The first inequality because p > w, the second because

and ε < 1. Because of (A3), L* will

increase with q until it reaches qf which for which the equilibrium value of L equals Lf. Below this value
knowledge will by unformalized, above it, formalized.
Propositions 2 and 3
First, consider the entry threshold for new technology firms. They can profitably enter when the
equilibrium price exceeds their unit cost.14 Since c(0) = 0, c(L) is approximately zero for small L. Then
the minimum unit cost for a new technology firm will simply be w/q. From (2b), entry at some scale will
be feasible when
(A4)

or

.

Next, consider the condition for drastic innovation where the equilibrium price with N=0 is less than or
equal to w. Setting the price equal to w in (2a) and rearranging, let
(A5)

.

Also, by taking the implicit derivative of (2a) with N=0,
(A6)

.

This means that once the price falls below w, additional increases in q will increase total output (= 2 q
L*), driving the price even lower. From this it follows that the drastic equilibrium will hold in the region
where
q > qd.
Limit pricing will be feasible when the new technology firms can profitably supply the entire market at a
price of w. For a given q, the new technology firms will need Ll workers each to supply the market
where
. It will be profitable for them to do so when

14. I maintain the assumption of efficient exchange of knowledge for simplicity. In a more realistic
model, a firm might not share its knowledge under some conditions if that might keep the other firm
from entering.
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(A4)

or

.

Note by inspection that
. This shows parts (a) and (c) of Proposition 2. Part (b) follows
directly from this and Proposition 1.
. Also, ql= 1 if c = 0. Proposition 3 follows from this.

Finally, note from (A4) that
Proposition 4

The first order maximizing conditions with no knowledge exchange are
(A5)

.

First, consider the drastic case, where N = c' = 0. Then these can be solved for equilibrium values
(A6)

and

.

We seek to explore the variation of firm profits with the technology qualities of the two firms.
Expressing profits of firm 1 as
(A7)

,

we seek to investigate the sign of
(A8)
where i,j = 1,2. I will show the calculation for i=2, j=1 and the reader can repeat the method for the
other cases. Note first that by the envelope theorem, the second term is zero. Also the first term is zero.
Then, using (A6),
(A9)

.

The second part of the proposition concerns the case with positive communication costs (unformalized),
but where N grows asymptotically large. The analog to (A6) is
(A10)

and

.

For the case where i=2 and j=1, the first two terms in (A8) drop out as before, but now
because x2 has no influence on the equilibrium price, thus
(A11)

.
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The other combinations follow in a similar manner.
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Table 1.

Pre-commercial
research
q < qe

Unformalized
knowledge

Formalized
knowledge

aviation < 1909
ACE inhibitors < 1977

Commercial,
coexistence
equilibrium
qe < q < qu, qf

Commercial,
drastic
equilibrium
qu, qf < q

power loom < 1840
dye chemistry < 1869
digital wireless < 1990
steel minimills

power loom > 1895
dye chemistry > 1869
digital wireless > 1990
ACE inhibitors > 1977
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Figure 1. Solution regions
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Figure 2. Changes in patenting with formalization
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